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In this article I explore the question of videogame cybersubjects and the myths
of violence and identification made available by the new interactive media so
as to vivify what is at stake when it comes to educational technologies. I
introduce the concept of interpassivity to provide an aspect of technological
interactivity that is missing in the current discussions. I use a Lacanian psycho-
analytic paradigm as an antithetical research orientation to gain a better grasp
of the fantasy formations of what I deem, following the lead of Deleuze and
Guattari (1977), to be a schizophrenic identity position of students today.
How to Read This Essay: Some Preliminary Questions and Responses
I begin in a somewhat unusual manner by addressing several questions neces-
sitated by a peer review of an earlier version of this article: Why discuss
videogames in the context of education? What is research in the context of this
article given that ajer is a research journal? And finally, what have videogames
to do with educational technology anyway? All three questions point to a
policing of what should and should not appear in ajer’s covers. My opening is
a rhetorical move to open up and rethink the boundaries of research, technol-
ogy, and education to let in what is often screened out in their respective
discursive domains in order to advance the force of an argument that has no
pretense of certainty.
What could be farther from education than violent videogames? This is
precisely the point as to why they deserve our attention in education itself,
because as an institution in its modernist form, education has worked hard to
keep itself framed as a serious endeavor. As “pure” entertainment, videogames
appear to be the antithesis of the serious business of education. Although
creative play has always been part of educational discourse, most often easily
justified and contained within the confines of elementary grades where such
rhetoric can still sell, its binary opposite—work—begins to dominate as the
pressure to find a job in the social symbolic order becomes more and more
pronounced and pressing in high school and later in postsecondary institu-
tions. The separation between major and minor subjects, primary and com-
plementary subjects, rests along these same binary lines: as subjects of leisure
that have lost ground in our schools (the fine arts, physical education) and
subjects of cognition, notably the sciences. However, C.P. Snow’s (1993) some-
what forgotten charge that there are two separate cultures (science and the
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humanities) has begun to break down, causing difficulties for educators in
preparing students for the job market. How do we balance skill acquisition and
pragmatic degrees with the more “useless” subject areas that seem (at first)
periphery to business interests? Capitalism needs flexible creative subjects who
are able to span technology with social science, but all too often the choice in
the legitimate marketplace is either between the immediacy of McJobs that pay
little, or to wait between seven and nine years by attending a Canadian post-
secondary institution, the time required before a professional position is
secured (Finnie, 2002).
The postmodern condition has broken down this once established moder-
nist binary of work/play, making education more and more a performative
task of entertainment: a sophisticated Muppet Show supported by the tech-
nological wizardry of “smart rooms” and the constant stream of technological
innovations. In our media-saturated environment, we see everywhere this
breakdown between work and play, as the aestheticization of knowledge takes
place through the influences of designer capitalism. Even the driest of subjects
like philosophy has to take on the mantle of entertainment. Books—such as the
series written by Mark Rowlands, which includes such titles as The Philosopher
at the End of the Universe, Philosophy Explained Through Science Fiction Films
(2003), and William Irwin’s edited series that includes the philosophies of
Seinfeld (2000), The Simpsons (2001), and The Matrix (2002)—now combine (low)
popular culture with (high) theory to present the hybridic equivalent of an
infomercial as serious scholarship. Science, as the Discovery Channel amply
shows, has followed suit. Mathematics education, again considered as one of
the most dry, difficult, and cerebral subjects, has been flooded with “interactive
manipulables” and visuals to help learners grasp abstract concepts.
Education has become a juggling act nestled between pure entertainment
and raw bankable facts: by now that familiar dilemma where the confusion of
fact as fiction and fiction as fact has become standard fare leading to paradoxes
and Derridean issues of undecidability. As a hegemonic public discourse, it can
no longer entirely toe the modernist line of objective, testable knowledge
(although it tries, as in Bush’s fantasy of No Child Left Behind), nor can it fall
entirely into pure entertainment. To do so would be a loss of public responsi-
bility and trust, like those accusations first levied against A.S. Neil’s experi-
mental and residential Summerhill School founded in 1921. The practice of
education ends up split or fractured. In its classrooms the serious business of
learning goes on, while in its corridors social clubs, dances, and after-hours
sport events: entertainment prevails.
Generally speaking, from this fractured state of managing the contradiction
between modernist and postmodernist identity formations—that is, between
an education of the mind that constantly bumps against its limit, the body—a
crisis of identity emerges that I identify as schizophrenic, following the lead of
Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1987), who specifically link such an identity to the
workings of postmodern spectacular capitalism. Students schizophrenically
live out this impossible split on the one hand, as the necessity of discipline
offered to them by the school or a postsecondary institution to find work. And
on the other hand, the “freedom” associated with the entertainment industry
(as media consumption, mall-ing, partying, clubbing) lived out after school or
j. jagodzinski
46
AJER journal spring 2007.indd   46 4/3/07   3:11:08 PM
outside school and on the weekends.1 For students who must further support
themselves through postsecondary institutions by taking on service-sector Mc-
Jobs, the escape into the excesses of consumption becomes even more pressing
and schizoid. Alcohol binging and drug use are especially prevalent
(Weitzman, Nelson, & Wechsler, 2003).
To avoid the schizophrenia of pleasure (discussed below psychoanalytically
as jouissance) and discipline brings us back to the contradiction of learning itself
in a postmodern age; that is, to find how to overcome the mind-body split
bequeathed by Enlightenment rationality. Transpositionally, this schizo-
phrenic contradiction manifests itself between violent videogames, which can
be characterized as “pure” affective body, and the seriousness of the discipline
of education, most often theorized as “pure” mind. I argue that examining
violent videos opens questions of identity that trouble our students today. The
violence that videogames present is simply symptomatic of postmodernity,
expressive of the paranoia, dystopia, and conspiracy rhetoric that shape the
mediated culture with which our students live as they take their seats in our
classrooms.
The extraordinary aspect about videogames is that they also tell us some-
thing about the influx of educational technologies into our schools and post-
secondary institutions. Technology as it is most commonly thought of in
education refers simply to the tools, equipment, machines, and instruments
that aid and enhance learning. We get caught up in what such instrumentation
can do for us. Heidegger (1977), in his well-known essay “The Question Con-
cerning Technology,” worries about this commonsense assumption and under-
standing of technology, arguing that technology is in its essence a way of
revealing. As he famously argued, this form of technological revealing in West-
ern thought has enabled the hegemony of representation to maintain its
sovereignty. Under its instrumental regime of Ge-stell (enframing), objects are
reduced to a “standing-reserve” (Bestand; we need only think of computer
databanks here), as resources for use value. Ge-stell constitutes the essence of
modern technology. Although this critique was well known to critical science
educators like Wiezenbaum (1976) and Dreyfus (1992), who tried to steer a
different path for technology, in the broad picture of education little has
changed to offset it. Rather, computerization and digitization in schools have
simply furthered the ordering process and closed off other modes of revealing
to which technology is capable. To mitigate this charge of technological instru-
mentation, the rhetoric of interactivity has been effectively used by its sup-
porters to claim an involvement in student subjectivity and thereby agency to
enhance learning. The benefits of the interactive computerized classroom are
the standard response to quell any alarmist concerns of standardization. I
dispute this claim in this article by drawing on videogame interactivity as a
paradigm case.
Now oddly enough, videogames also give us insight into where educa-
tional technology that continues in the direction of representation is likely to
lead. In order to pull the student into its screen of learning, obviously more and
more of the affective body has to come into play. One of the stark criticisms of
earlier educational technologies was how bleak, uninviting, and cold they
were. Recall the criticism of the impoverishment of Papert’s (1980) drawings of
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computerized flowers in Mindstorms when compared to young children mess-
ing with real paint, brushes, paper, and so forth, which incorporates as much of
the body’s senses as possible. To remedy such educational technology, we will
have to move in the direction of the aestheticization already advanced by video
computer games. As any number of earlier studies indicated (Cassell & Jenkins,
1998; Provenzo, 1991; Sheff, 1994), what make videogames so enjoyable are the
advances in graphic technology that have taken place. A hyper-aesthetic has
evolved where color intensity has been enhanced; three-dimensional charac-
ters are able to move in various directions; in some games they can be made to
grow or shrink; the background settings have become more dramatic and
fantastic; the speed and repertoire of movements of the characters have in-
creased; and so forth. Even the console player can be self-reflexively split. In
some game situations the player can engage in the action as an “ego-shooter,”
as if he or she were the avatar; or it is possible to stand back and watch the
action from a distance, taking a point of view anywhere on the screen. A third
option is to move back and forth from these two options. Yet it should be noted
that no matter how much freedom the console player seems to have, ultimately
he or she is shaped and guided by the software, which has only so many
degrees of freedom built into its circuitry. In and of themselves, violent
videogames have simplistic plot structures so as to enhance the affective incor-
poration of the body. Making the narratives more sophisticated (and therefore
more cerebral) distances the body’s involvement, raising the question: What
form of revealing should education be engaged in if it is not to continue to head
in the direction of learning as a sophisticated, spectacularly engaging infomer-
cial?
When it comes to the question of research in this article, my immediate
retort is to ask, Just what sort of research avoids falling into yet another
technological enframing (Ge-stell)? It should be pointed out that whenever
“empirical” data are used, especially in the varieties of ethnographic re-
searches, power differentials are set up, and data are most often used as a means
to an end, confirming Heidegger’s (1977) charge of technological abuse. Rather
laughable (without being overly cynical) are the responses of teen informants
(and adults) when asked by researchers why they play these violent games.
Reponses like “They’re cool,” “I dunno, I just like to play,” and “It’s fun” are
empty of insight, whereas the talk of special effects, the weapons, action, gore,
scenery, and so forth are common. No articulate reflective explanation is given
of the why of such passionate attachments. Equally amusing is the conclusion
reached by Media Awareness Network (1998), a Canadian research arm
devoted to helping teachers sort out how students are to use media and the
dangers inherent in them. In a major study on videogame culture, researchers
concluded,
The main surprise came from the fact that the young people we surveyed were
largely in agreement with the criticism of harmful effects of violent games and
the potential for videogame addiction. Many of them felt that there were some
negative consequences associated with playing violent games and that many
kids played too much.
The emptiness of informants’ responses and the common disavowal by
media viewers such as the above statement (it is always my little brother or
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sister who is harmed by media violence, but I, being older or an adult, am not,
so there are harmful effects (I think?), but it is the other who experiences them,
not me) are commonly found in media research. For my article I chose the
discourse of the analyst as developed by the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan
(1977) in order to provide another way of revealing in research that avoids a
play of the power of enframing. To escape this circuitry of power, I deliberately
take a “no-madic” position as the discourse of the analyst that focuses on desire
and struggles with how unconscious desire is revealed by what is unsaid and
invisible, through what is fetishized and disavowed. No-madic research, if it
can be called that, attempts to read the unconscious transferences of desire in
media texts, transference being the central means by which a person’s uncon-
scious desires and conflicts manifest themselves in analysis (jagodzinski, 2004).
Lacanian psychoanalysis recognizes an impossible gap between the speaking
unconscious subject and the subject of discursive speech; between the unique-
ness of the individual and the spoken, heard, and seen language of enuncia-
tion. Desire is the excess of language that dwells in this gap and properly
belongs to the unconscious. It seems, however, that what is not convertible into
information and mobilization for the sake of power appears deficient, in-
definable, and lacking in being, and by the scientific community not considered
research. There is a certain unproductive mode of such an attempt to grasp the
workings of unconscious desire, a letting be of the force of the argument itself.
So is Lacanian psychoanalysis research perhaps not to be included within the
pages of ajer?
Avatars of Identification?
The virtual world of videogames and the acclaimed interactivity that accom-
panies it present an unprecedented challenge to theorize the subject caught up
in its spin. Neither television nor film, although related via the screen, offer a
comparable experience. Educational technology has a long history of embrac-
ing the value of such interactivity when it comes to the transference of learning.
Videogames are the epitome of what might be called the illusion of the fiction
of presence. The relay time between a player and its avatar appears instan-
taneous, as if time did not exist—only space, confirming Paul Virillio’s long-
standing critique of the loss of time as duration. More than any other
media—short of self-contained virtual environments like the Computerized
Automatic Visual Environment CAVE) where the console user is inside—
videogames enable a fetishistic disavowal to take place between the screen and
the player: “I know that this is ‘just’ a game, but nevertheless I am playing it as
it were ‘real.’” Although various attempts at deconstruction and poststruc-
turalist theory have worked hard to dispell this illusion of separation, it stub-
bornly persists, revealing that it is fantasy that supports reality and not the
other way around.
In this article I question not only media interactivity, but also the violence
that surrounds videogames. I do this so that educators might rethink their
stance toward two commonsense assumptions that have become the staple of
the current technological and educational paradigm: namely, media interac-
tivity (chat rooms, blogs, e-learning, and so on) and the negative effects of
media violence as best exemplified by videogames. In terms of educational
media interactivity, the videogame (minus its violence) could be considered
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the ideal technological learning environment in a postmodern climate where
entertainment and knowledge have collapsed in on one another as entertain-
ment. I present the exploration of this question from a Lacanian psychoanalytic
viewpoint.
For the first time—ever, it seems—the spectator-player can identify with his
or her own body as an object immediately on the screen; as an alter ego in the
form of an avatar that occupies a space of fantasy that is virtual and imaginary.
It is as if the avatar were an ephemeral being capable of acting, like a ghost, a
guardian angel or devil. It occupies a space that belongs neither completely to
the game world (or a chat world), nor can it be conclusively identified with the
console-player. Rather, it hovers somewhere between them in virtual cyber-
space. It acts like an empty linguistic shifter, an I that can be occupied by
anyone. A chat-room avatar, no matter how sophisticated and tailor-designed
it may be, although awkward at first, can still be occupied by virtually anyone.
On the one hand, the console-player does have a continual identification with
his or her avatar as it roams through a game’s diegesis, but on the other hand,
this identification is oddly empty. The avatar is like a shell covering its imagi-
nary occupant, which is occupied only as long as it remains alive. Such a
libidinal investment is strongly associated with an avatar’s agency, which the
console-player does not fully control. After all, the game has rules, limits, and
goals. It has a certain independence of its own. Once dead, however, it can be
revived again. This is highly significant because this initiates an endless loop of
death and resurrection, facilitating a compulsion to repeat obsessively an ac-
tion so that a player can confirm himself or herself through such an alter ego.
One learns in this way, yet failure is being perverted. This desire to repeat is
driven by a sense of mastery, which is informed by aggression because perfec-
tion is seldom achieved. Incremental satisfaction rather than failure is inherent-
ly built into the game. All players reach a certain level of skill, which then
becomes impossible to surpass. The videogame may be abandoned or the
player can become fixated, obsessed in wanting to “beat the game.”
Such behavior caricatures perfectly Freud ’s (1920) description in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle of a dialectic between two games that he watched his
grandson play. The first game, characteristically called fort/da, describes the
mechanism of desire (Begehren). The child throws the cotton reel outside his
crib, wanting it to come back and secure his position in language. A goal is to
be attained for the child is a subject who lacks in being. The attempt is to
capture a missing part that would give him the comfort of feeling complete.
The cotton reel and his mother are the “lost” objects he must learn to cope with.
There is a failure in his attempt to retrieve the cotton reel. The action will be
repeated to bring back what has been lost. Such failure often results in fits of
temper. However, the child learns that he or she must live with such failure,
that he or she is ultimately a fallible human being.
The second game describes the mechanism of the drives (Triebe), as it
directly addresses the videogame experience. Freud’s grandson would hide
beneath a mirror for a time, and then suddenly jump up to see his reflection,
repeating this over and over again. Here the game is not structured by failure,
but by satisfaction. This is its aim, not goal. Sometimes this game stops when it
becomes too painful to laugh from so much fun. In the Lacanian
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psychoanalytic paradigm, this is referred to as jouissance: painful satisfaction or
“enjoyment.” This is not simply pleasure, but pleasure that reaches an excess.
It is this excessive pleasure, of course, that raptures the body in videogames,
and it is this same pleasure that educators continually discipline in their class-
rooms. To let a class get out of hand already identifies a body out of control.
Subjects of the body (like drama, music, visual art, and physical education)
clash with subjects of the mind (mathematics, science, social studies), causing
management problems as students move from one class into another defined
by another discourse and expectation. This separation of subject areas, as is
well known, is a modernist legacy, a cultural survival that continues to hamper
educational possibilities.
Videogames pervert the structure of desire (the first game) through the
drives (the second game). They are structured more by the experience of
jouissance; by the painful pleasure of having one’s avatar live and die in an
endless loop. The goal of beating the game becomes a secondary matter. Beating
opponents in the game or other players who challenge for mastery can sub-
limate aggressivity. In videogames like Myst, for example, the goal is intention-
ally missing. Knowing the narrative is no longer important. A player has to
figure out its purpose. But it is the jouissance of the journey that provides the
entertainment: in the aim of not knowing what the purpose is rather than being
directed by the purpose (goal) itself. Each moment of a videogame’s diegesis is
structured to satisfy the player’s drives; that is, the auditory and visual sensa-
tions that affect the body below the level of consciousness. The action of an
avatar (from a ping pong paddle to a gun, tank, or spaceship) is more like a
bumper car exhibition ride. The ride has no direct goal other than getting hit or
dodging an oncoming vehicle, depending how brave the driver is. The minor
shocks to the body are part of the painful fun and dependent on risk, yet not
pushed to the degree of the broken bones that go along with extreme sports. It
is basically a safe ride. At the same time, learning does take place. The driver
learns how much he or she willing to risk. However, with videogames the
danger of physical pain drops out. Videogames enable a vicarious experience:
the thrill without the danger like the addictive clips (virtual reality disks)
Lenny Nero peddles in Bigelow’s (1995) Strange Days. These videodisks are
inserted into a Superconducting Quantum Interface Device (SQUID), a device
that fits over the head and looks like a squid, its tentacles forming pressure
points on certain parts of the cranium, emitting electric impulses that reach
deep into the brain’s hypothalamus. The user vicariously and synaesthetically
reexperiences a memory through his or her body. So one wonders if this is the
future of technological education based on representation. What exactly is lost
when medical and surgical students dissect computer-simulated cadavers to
learn their skills? Or on a smaller scale, what is lost when the biology student
slices up a three-dimensional computer-simulated frog with a laser mouse?
The fantasy that the SQUID device suggests is that whatever is lost can be
recovered and then directly transferred into another body, making learning a
technologically instantaneous affair.
Ego games (sometimes called first-person shooter games) abet this drive
experience by organizing the interface around a software-simulated camera or
an external camcorder that puts a player into the picture to enhance this bodily
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affect; something exciting and intense is always happening. An avatar’s im-
mortal cyberspace existence enables the repetitiveness of an action to continue,
as physical death is rendered null and void. This raises all kinds of ethical and
political problems in some chat communities about the agency of the avatars in
them, which researchers such as Turkle (1995) and Stone (1996) have inter-
rogated. A player forms a love-hate relationship with his or her avatar, ena-
bling full flights of jouissance to take place. Frustration and joy can be vetted
through the virtual creature. At one moment it is loved for having ac-
complished the desired moves (destroyed the enemy, jumped to a new level,
dogged an impending obstacle, etc.), whereas in the next it becomes a piece of
“good-for-nothing sh*t” for having failed in its task. These extreme states of
emptying and filling the drive (im)pulses are what keep the player interested.
The libidinal investment flickers back and forth like Freud’s grandson jumping
up and seeing himself in the mirror. There is as much enjoyment in the failure
as in the success; as much intensity of losing as winning in the context of the
moment. The avatar literally “falls to pieces” (disintegrates, fragments,
evaporates), reverting to what Lacan (1977) referred to as a “body in pieces”
(pp. 9-10), a pre-egoic time of human development when a child had not yet
formed a gestalt of its bodily image. It feels helpless in relation to its desired
idealized mirror image. When the avatar is magically restored, psychically the
player’s ego comes together again to continue the game—perhaps with more
determination and cautionary care. In this way a player “beats himself or
herself up” for not having done better, experiencing masochistic pleasure
while doing so. Satisfaction is achieved when the gaming circuit has been
completed, not unlike those computerized self-taught programs where a stu-
dent receives so many credits for also having completed the course. The pre-
dominance of such drive subjectivity in postmodernity reveals how identity is
experienced, what Gergen (1991) popularly characterized as the “saturated
self.”
There is something quite sinister in all this participatory action that has
consequences for educational technology that insists on following a similar
path. From this hyped interaction between a player and its avatar emerges its
shadow side: interpassivity. Interpassivity is a term coined by an Austrian
philosopher Pfaller (2000; see also Zizek, 2002), who was perhaps the first to
argue that in a strange way, the avatar enjoys the game as much as the player.
It is the uncanny notion that in this flickering back and forth of drive impulses,
the avatar (more accurately the computer program) is also in control. This is
simply illustrated by all word-processing programs. The program writes you
as you write it. The cursor hails you. You must find it on the screen. Its software
establishes constraints of formatting and grammar should the writer choose to
pay attention to them. Complex sentences are soon reduced to simple senten-
ces if the writer chooses to obey the program. Like R2D2 of Star Wars, the
computer “communicates” with its console user through a soundscape of
auditory clues. It makes a startup noise to let one know it is ready. Videogames
are even denser soundscapes of clues that must be attended to. They act as an
auditory supplement to enhance the body’s involvement through the various
tonal vibrations of sound.
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What appears as interactive flexibility also has interpassive structuring
effects on how we write, think, and of course play games. The paranoiac fear of
interpassivity is that the machine will eventually take over our lives, that we
will have no choice but to obey its programming. The console player loses
interactive mastery as the program begins to do it “all for you.” Already word
programs self-correct spelling as we mistype words. The machine now begins
to “enjoy” at the expense of the player as mastery is forfeited and we allow it to
take over human decision-making. This already happens with illicit video
lottery terminals (VTLs) where the player hardly ever wins because the odds
have been tampered with. In a bizarre way, it is the VTL who plays the player.
Walt Disney’s Tron (Lisberger, 1982) was probably the first science fiction film
that explored such a paranoiac vision, raising the fundamental obsessive ques-
tion: “Am I human or a machine?” Videogame avatars can be thought of as
simple artificial intelligence (AI) devices, ancestors to the walking and talking
dolls built by bio-engineer J.F. Sebastian in Scott’s Blade Runner (also produced
in 1982). The avatars of the future will be our walking and talking mannequins
that are programmed to take on our imprints, characteristics, know our family
history, and so on—as poignantly explored in Isaac Asminov’s short story
adapted to the screen by Chris Columbus film Bicentennial Man (1999); or they
might be like SimOne, Andrew Niccol’s (2002) fantasy about a digitally created
actress who becomes a screen star. SimOne is nothing more than a sophisticated
software program.
The obsessive fear of educational technology emerges when questions of an
emerging posthuman body begin to complicate learning with the possible use
of nanotechnology, neuromorphic robotics, molecular engineering, autonomic
computing, and bioengineering such as smart skin. Our students are already
cyborgs, as are their teachers. The day is not far away when the i-pods, cell
phones, and various video-transmitting systems that are used now for enter-
tainment purposes become integrated into teaching and learning. To think
otherwise seems folly. Design communities composed of fine artists with tech-
nological prowess and technicians with aesthetic sensibilities, however, will
have to face not only the usual ethical questions being raised by religious
zealots and more sober rationally minded philosophers such as More (2004),
but the human psyche itself. As a vast number of sci-fi movies have explored
(as mentioned above), it is the question of unconscious identity and the circula-
tion of desire that remain the true question marks of science. No amount of
neurological tampering will somehow make our brains transparent. The most
innovative work brings the science of neurology together with psychoanalysis,
as neuro-psychoanalysis (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Once more, videogames
and psychoanalytic theorizing can offer us insights here as well to question the
Ge-stell of educational technology.
Fantasies of Identification
The most damaging accusation levied at violent videogames seems to be that
they simply reinscribe patriarchal norms and normative concepts of sex-
gender (Provenzo, 1991). Computer game producers simply reinforce the
heterosexual binary by producing games targeted for each sex, naively iden-
tified biologically. To appeal to hetero boys, women are often represented in a
negative light as sex objects, scantly clad, abducted, murdered, and so forth.
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Yet the industry has cleverly developed postfeminist characters (like Lara
Croft, Joanna Dark, Jill Valentine) such that a wide range of female characters
exist, including androgynous and lesbian figures to offset this criticism (jagod-
zinski, 2004). Further, identity is not simply and naively spelled out along
biological and gendered lines. This is dramatically demonstrated by Rand’s
(1995) study of a girl’s “queer” Barbie. How dolls, games, and toys are appro-
priated and played with by child consumers can be dramatically at odds with
the images and meanings that are culturally embedded as acceptable or in-
tended by videogame manufactures. This is all the more reason why a psycho-
analytic understanding of identity is necessary.
The drive culture of violent videogames is able to address the schizophrenic
self of postmodernity in ways that schooling, it seems, cannot. A videogame
avatar sets out a subject position that a console player is invited to embody.
This allows for cross-gender and same-sex identifications, which run the entire
gamut of possibilities. Adolescent heterosexual boys may enjoy becoming a
buxom gun-toting girl who “kicks ass” for any number of psychic gratifica-
tions. It may well be a way to overcome shyness with the opposite sex; it may
be a way to master the opposite sex; it may be a way to show secret admiration
for strong women, and so forth. Heterosexual girls, similarly, can enjoy becom-
ing a muscle-bound hero for similar unconscious desires: to cope with the
opposite sex, to compete against her brothers, to master the opposite sex, and
so forth. Lesbian and gay identifications complicate the fantasy structures
further, providing a rich hypercomplex dense number of possibilities of “get-
ting off” one’s jouissance (Allison, 2001). The range of avatars available—from
hypersexed to androgynous bodies—enables a variety of fantasy scenarios to
be played out. The avatar becomes the site of a contested space. Admittedly
videogame avatar bodies have tended to remain heterosexual and hypersexual:
heteronormativity does dominate the market. But in genres where fans write
their own characters online by developing a collective story—in fanzines, slash
zines, and Japanese animé—an entire range of transsexual characters appears.
It is through these figures that the domination of the symbolic order that
structures identities by labeling them through discursive signification (e.g.,
what a real man and woman should be like) is resisted and played with. For
educators, this should be perceived as a healthy activity for the psyche because it enables
conflicts to be sublimated and worked through. It offers queer youth a way to
deconstruct the masculine/feminine binary.
Such a view goes against the usual claims by followers of Althusser (1971),
who argue that console players are always already interpellated and sutured
into the ideology implicit in the diegesis of the videogame, made possible
through the transparency of the apparatus that conceals the enunciation of the
symbolic order. But fantasy life on the screen does takes place on two simul-
taneous planes, which are heterogeneous to each other. One is ideologically
discursive as structured by the diegesis of the game itself; the other is figural.
Figural is Lyotard’s (1971) term that identifies the visual and aural aspects of
discourse that deconstruct the “letter” of meaning by recognizing the aesthetic
“line” that forms it. The “letter and the line” are heterogeneous but not mutual-
ly exclusive planes of experience. One cannot exist without the other. The
figural, therefore, is an allusive property of the visual: a side product. It is what
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cannot be entirely framed. The story alone is not sufficient to structure iden-
tification. Rather, the affective dimension of figurality is where the bodily
identification takes place below the level of consciousness. This is a conflicted
zone, shaped by a “logic of sense,” as Deleuze (1990) would say, by intensities
and forces that appear imperceptible to our conscious attention. This is where
neurology takes over to create an affective virtual body subject to (largely)
universal affective reactions (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
It is in the concern with this figural bodily zone that parental and educa-
tional critique is most pronounced, especially when it comes to violent videos
games that make up most of the market in North America (Cassell & Jenkins,
1998). Parents, teachers, and politicians have generally condemned the blood
and gore that they see graphically demonstrated in these games. They fear that
boys will become desensitized brutes and exhibit aggressive behaviors toward
others, especially when it comes to solving social problems as a result of
playing hours and hours of such games as Counter Strike and Mortal Combat, to
name but two that have been singled out in the news over the years, linked to
high-profile spectacular events like the shooting at Columbine High School
(Littleton, Colorado) and Gutenberg-Gymnasium (Erfurt, Germany).2 This is
obviously an unfounded fear given that millions of children in North America
are engaged in violent videogames, yet only a handful commit actual acts of
violence. For those few a psychoanalytic explanation is more to the point as
discussed below. Ironically, politicians and well-meaning parents have used
media as a scapegoat to blame the perceived increase of aggressivity in their
communities and schools. Violent computer and videogames provide an ex-
cuse to generate moral panic, as well as entitling conservative government
officials to call for stricter censorship laws in the name of protecting citizens.
Lucrative, well-funded government research on violent videos has taken on
increased statistical sophistication. Profiling has become the new standard
where violence researchers attempt to construct a profile of a potential per-
petrator who plays violent videogames by identifying all the variables that can
lead to acting out aggressively, including possibly committing mass murder.
Sex, gender, age, family background, school records, divorced parents, and so
forth provide a cross-section of who is most likely to commit such crimes
(Anderson & Dill, 2000).3
Psychoanalytic Research
Under normal neurotic circumstances, computer and video violence help to
sublimate aggressivity, especially in boys. By sublimation, I mean the ability to
work out frustrations and pent-up behaviors creatively so that the body’s
libidinal drives are satisfied through harmless fantasies rather than through
actual acting out. Jones’ (2002) journalistic accounts of his experiences over
many years working with youth as a cartoonist and workshop art teacher is an
unusual testimony of how important it is for children to “kill their monsters”
through the fantasy frames of computer and videogames. This has been the
standard defense for enabling children to act out symbolically aggressive fan-
tasies that goes back to Bettelheim (1976). To take this approach means that
educational practices of technology would have to take into consideration the
excessive jouissance that remains repressed in schools; that technology be used
against itself to sublimate aggressivity artistically.4 Currently not enough oppor-
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tunities are provided in schools and in society at large for children to work out their
aggressions transformatively and artistically. Schools on the whole do not risk this
therapeutic ground because it again questions the seriousness of work and
explores bodily drives (Triebe). However, the technologies harnessed by the
visual and dramatic arts offer another form of revealing in Heidegger’s (1993)
sense. As he put it,
There was a time when it was not technicity alone that bore the name techne.
Once the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant
appearance was also called techne. There was a time when the bringing forth of
the true into the beautiful was called techne. The poiesis of the fine arts was also
called techne. (p. 339)
Against the Ge-stell of Western techne as a mode of revealing that calculates,
orders, and organizes being into a standing resource, poiesis by contrast is a
transformative event that changes relations in an unproductive mode of simply
letting be. The difficult question remains, to what extent are videogames
poiesic? This is the great challenge of educational technologies that must
engage the body as well as tackle issues of ethical concerns.5
However, I present a balanced view as to what the dangers of videogame
violence might be. Unfortunately, it is always the spectacularized examples
that bring to light the dangers that do indeed exist. I approach the question of
identity from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, primarily that of Lacan (1977) and
his development of the subject and of fantasy. In this view, virtual reality (VR)
and real lived life (RL) are intimately connected. These are not separate realms.
How we perceive ourselves is in terms of fantasy; that is, our lives are narrated
as fictions. Normal perception enables us to maintain a fantasy frame as to who
we are and how we are perceived by others: by society as such. VR and RL are
framed together in the belief systems that we hold. In Lacan’s terms we have an
Ideal Ego of how we perceive ourselves and an Ego Ideal of how significant
others gaze at us. For example, teachers have in their mind what an ideal
student should be like. Although this is a fiction that can never be occupied by
any student, some students in the class come close to behaving like an ideal
student. Their gaze structures how they perceive their class. As symbolic
representatives of society, they desire their class to behave in a particular way.
This is what we mean by Ego Ideal. Of course, the Ideal Ego of the student and
the Ego Ideal of the institution of education are often at odds, causing conflict
and transgression.
The computer screen acts as a fantasy space for our desires. It is an imagi-
nary space that is structured by a missing piece, a final signifier, what Lacan
called the objet a—the object cause of desire. This means that the fantasy space
that engages our desires, our imaginary fictive life, is structured by something
we unconsciously wish or want, but that is unavailable. The screen is only a lure
or frame, a container that beckons us into its space to satisfy this missing piece
of our desire. This missing piece would make us whole, satisfy our cravings.
For Lacan (1977) the subject is therefore structured by this missing piece, this
final signifier, this hole or lack within ourselves. We want to be whole: feel fully
framed as an ego, but there is a hole in the w(hole). Unconscious desire tries to
fill the hole or lack that we consciously feel but are unable quite to articulate.
There are, then, two different but complementary ways of understanding
j. jagodzinski
56
AJER journal spring 2007.indd   56 4/3/07   3:11:13 PM
desire. There is a conscious desire through the fantasy formation of the screen
image, as well as unconscious desire, which is not to be found in the screen
image. This unconscious desire (the lack, hole, missing piece) is what structures
conscious fantasy in the first place. It is what drives us to repeat a behavior that
would satisfy our ego. Such satisfaction is what sublimation is all about.
With this background in mind, I psychoanalytically discuss several fan-
tasies that have emerged in violent computer and videogames. I do not discuss
the content of these games; that is, there is no need to discuss videogame
narratives as these are too numerous to mention. (Generally speaking, the
generic narrative of violent videogames is simple: the earth is under siege by
some kind of alien enemy, and there is a mission for the player to accomplish.)
The approach, rather, is to discuss the structure of the fantasy that is driven by
the missing piece, by the lack that structures the fantasy in the first place: to
raise the question of why violent videogames are so fascinating, particularly in
the sociopolitical climate of postmodernity, where not only is violence ubiqui-
tous, but a crisis of identity has come to the fore (Frosh, 1991). The proviso is, as
argued above, that videogames pervert this structure of desire by forwarding
the structure of the drive in its stead.
Psychotic Fantasy
No doubt the most spectacular account of violent videogames has been their
implication in school shootings. Kliebard and Harris, who were responsible for
the Columbine High School killing spree in Littleton, Colorado, were heavy
players of Doom, an ego-shooter game where the issue of interpassivity is on
full display. The figures do all the shooting for the player, and the player
vicariously lives out the drama on the screen. A former United States Lt. Col.
David Grossman (Grossman & Frankowski, 2004), an evangelical born-again
Christian, blamed the shootings directly on this game, offering seminars to
teachers and concerned parents to show how Harris and Kliebard had used the
same tactics in the school as in the game and had perfected their aim by playing
it continually. However, the US secret service’s Threat Assessment Center
investigated major incidents of school violence since the 1970s to discover
whether violent videogames were involved. Of the 41 cases they investigated,
only five involved such games. The report concluded that of these five cases,
there was no direct evidence that they caused or led to the shooting (Benger,
2002). The company went public to reaffirm the obvious fact that thousands of
games of Doom are played each day that do not result in killing sprees. In
Erfurt, Steinhauser (“Steni” or “Rocky”) was an avid player of Counter Strike
and the band Slip Knot, and again the politicians and parents implicated the
game in causing the violence.
The psychotic break of the fantasy frame by such young people as Kliebard
and Harris happens when VR collapses into RL. The drives win out. In other
words, psychosis results in the lifting of the repressions of the Superego, the
Law itself. As Freud pointed out, the superego is a two-sided coin: it asks us to
obey the laws as well as to transgress them. Psychosis is when the transgressive
side of the superego overwhelms the lawful side. These kids really become
“outlaws” in this sense. What caused this psychotic break to happen is
anyone’s guess, because it is a contingent event. In the psychoanalytic litera-
ture, such mass killing sprees are a desperate cry for recognition, for not being
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subjectivized by society. Both these boys had been rejected at school, and it
came to a point where the “dead voice” of the superego told them to get even.
Rather than seeing violent games as the cause of this tragedy, it points out how
the fantasy frame actually prevents such tragedies from occurring. Kliebard
and Harris demonstrate the collapse of interactivity with interpassivity. The
interpassive avatar has taken over. They have become RL avatars. Under
normative circumstances, the fantasy frame is able to contain the anxiety of
what we cannot control. It helps pacify and sublimate these anxieties, which
threaten the body and can lead to a suicidal nonsublimated death drive. It is
precisely when these bodily drives (oral, anal, gaze, voice) are no longer “civi-
lized”—that is, when they no longer can find a creative outlet—that aggression
and trouble break out. At its most extreme, this leads to the spectacular act of
mass murder. Psychotic serial killers are another matter, which we need not
discuss here.
Obsessive Fantasy
An obsessive fantasy about computer games grips boys more than girls. Boys
become addicted to violent games to the point that it consumes their life. They
care little about school or what their parents want. They neglect their friends
and siblings (unless they are part of the culture) and everything else that
interferes with playing videogames. This is typical addictive behavior, which is
the opposite of the psychotic fantasy. Real Life (RL) collapses in to VR. Life is
led in the screen. This is perhaps the most remarkable example of pathological
interpassivity because the avatar has become the virtual alter ego. The existen-
tial question that structures the obsessional is: “Am I dead or alive?” (according
to Lacan). This means that paradoxically, Eros and Thanatos become reversed
phenomena. The video player is only “alive” when he is playing the game and
feels “dead” if he is not playing. In other words, everyday life is really “boring
dead,” whereas virtual life is alive and exciting.
Why does such an obsessive fantasy emerge during this particular historical
period? One explanation is to claim that many young people have lost their
faith and trust in the symbolic order of society, which causes an identity crisis.
They feel cynical or that they have no great jobs to fulfill their lives. The “crisis
of masculinity,” especially in the US’s working-class, white poor, has been
raised by scholars (Robinson, 2000) and fictionalized in such books as
Palahniuk’s (1999) popular novel Fight Club. Others feel that schooling and
parents cause too much pressure on them, more than they are capable of
accepting, or they feel entirely abandoned and neglected by their parents. VR
becomes an escape to avoid confronting the anguish of the social order. Many
young adults spend time in online virtual cities because it is far more exciting
than going out and facing real people. Becoming obessionally addicted to
videogames is a way of avoiding the anxiety of having to face the symbolic
order of society; that is, finding a place of recognition in it. This addictive
activity is particularly obvious while a person is growing up, the Oedipal
struggles that adolescents have to go through: playground bullying, meeting
the opposite sex, being cool like the in crowd. All these anxieties can be escaped
in VR, which brings us to the next fantasy.
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Hysterical Fantasy
Adolescence is also a time of anxiety about the opposite sex. Identity becomes
a real issue as both boys and girls are on their way to becoming sexualized
beings: the Ego Ideals of what it means to be a woman or a man. Postmodern
consumerism is charged with libidinal energy in how it presents performing
bodies. Both heterosexual and homosexual identification have come to the fore
as an area of heightened sexual anxiety. The pathologies of the body (bulimia,
anorexia) are potentially in play for everybody. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans-
sexual (LGBT) identities are often closeted in our schools. The sexual inter-
relationships between boys and girls come to heightened terms with the
expectation that one must have a great body, dress well, have a boyfriend or
girlfriend, and so forth. This postmodern anxiety over identity formation
results in a hysterical fantasy. Although girls are most likely to become hysteri-
cal, whereas most boys are most likely to display obsessive behavior, I claim no
clear sex/gender division. The hysteric is structured by the existential ques-
tion: “Am I a man or a woman?” (according to Lacan, 1977). In other words, the
hysteric does not accept what is being offered by the fantasies generated by the
symbolic order of society. She does not accept her role as it is defined by
society’s Ego Ideal, and she will actively avoid taking that subjective position.
This can go for the male as well. He may not accept the kind of masculine role
that is expected of him and so search for alternate fantasies, which place him in
another imaginary space. A frail boy may well be asking himself, “Am I a man
or a woman?” as he struggles with his masculinity. Identification with a macho
avatar is a way to prop up his manhood. In this sense he is hystericized,
uncertain where he belongs in the symbolic order.
The question of identification is even more pronounced by LGBT youth
who struggle to find fictive narratives with which they can identify. The point
of this background is to suggest that violent videogames have become sources
for cross-gender identifications. Girls online are involved in virtually every
conceivable violent videogame that boys play. The reason is that such game-
playing is empowering. It provides a fantasy status that they may not have in
their own RL situations. It also enables them to face the aggressivity of mas-
culinity and deal with it in their own way. Cross-gendering also takes place
with boys. Many videogames now have strong female figures (like Lara Croft
and Joanna Dark), where cross-identifying with these avatars also helps them
sublimate their feelings toward the other sex. On the one hand, a boy may be
absolutely terrified of the opposite sex. By playing with such avatars he can
come to some terms with these emotions. Whether boys are playing with
female action figure avatars for revenge or for respect, their feelings are sub-
limated. For LGBT youth such cross-identification is even more important
because it is perhaps one of the safest fantasy spaces where they can play out
their affective bodily feelings. Although cross-identifications are certainly com-
plex when it comes to unconscious desire, we can only see them being benefi-
cial in this case. Hysterical fantasies are a defense much like obsessional
fantasies because often the symbolic order does not legitimize fantasies where
sex/gender becomes an explicit category. More progressive countries have
health education programs where the moralism of virginity and abstinence
from sex is not preached, but the reality of sexual relations is discussed.
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To End … is to Begin
To conclude these thoughts on violence and identification in videogames for
education, the benefits are by and large healthy, but there are edges to them
that inevitably result because postmodernism is a time where the decentering
of the grand Western narratives has led to a decline in belief and trust in
authority with its ensuing identity crisis (jagodzinski, 2004). Postmodern forms
of traditionalism, cynicism, and neo-liberalism have arisen in such a climate of
uncertainty. As the 2004 reelection of President George Bush shows, there is
equally a strong desire to return to centering traditional values around the
Church and patriarchal forms of the family where marriage is clearly defined
and where men and women have clearly defined roles to play. The physical
violence of war and terrorist activities around the world reestablishes any
confusion about sex-gender identifications. “Real” men know the job that they
must do. Fear of the draft looms large. It is no wonder that so many young
people find escape routes into VR and find ways to cope with their emerging
struggles with identity through the safety of fantasy. However, we should not
be too surprised when such tragic moments like Columbine and Erfurt occur to
awaken us to the fact that human suffering is bubbling just below the surface:
repressed. Van Sant’s (2003) brilliant film Elephant, a succinct statement on the
Columbine tragedy, shows just how little teachers and parents understand of
the inner struggles of today’s youth. More dejected bodies are roaming the
hallways than we care to admit. Parents and educators need to allow youth to
explore their anxieties through the artistic means of their own fantasy forma-
tions. However, often such sublimating activities are too little or come too late.
The pain has found its aggressive outlet: “god” only knows how much pent up
aggression is manifested in real bullets in war-torn Iraq by young men on both
sides who are searching for a meaningful life, a cause that they can believe in.
The extremity of violent videogames and the fantasy scenarios they provide
for their console players are useful for grasping the schizophrenic RL of stu-
dents that is maintained by the often radical separation between schooling and
the media world that beckons them to consume. To incorporate popular cul-
ture into the curriculum through media technologies has its possibilities as well
as its pitfalls. Media educators struggle to find a way to preserve its seriousness
by applying the same forms of analysis found in print technologies to media
technologies, as if textual discourse were able to deal adequately with the
figural excess that screen images provide. The point I make obliquely in this
article is that psychoanalysis offers a strategy to deal with the fantasy life of
screen images that the new technologies have made ubiquitous. And that the
schizophrenic identity crisis that is shaped by the disciplinarity of the school
that still mostly runs on mechanized time, and its mediated outside world of
entertainment, requires poietic technologies with different forms of revealing
that directly grapple with the jouissance of the bodily drives.
Notes
1. Nowhere is this schizophrenia so dramatically illustrated as in Japan, a society with more
violent videogame players per capita than any other, which has generated the most violent
popular culture of video, comic, and film by way of manga animé and cosplay. Yet Japan is
perceived as one of the least violent post-industrial societies in the world (crime is organized
and syndicated there, like the Jakuza, for example), and where students once they have
graduated from high school and made their way into universities have the notorious
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reputation of going wild. Japanese businessmen have the same reputation of hard drinking,
dealing, and womanizing in the evenings (Yoshimura, & Anderson, 1997).
2. I would point out that studies about media violence almost always refer to boys. Physical
violence is the most common understanding of aggression. Girls are aggressive as well, but
this tends to be more psychological and structural rather than physical.
3. Such profiling proved controversial. Teachers in the US began to punish harmless aggressive
behaviors severely in schools once the profiles of Harris and Kliebard became known. A
nationwide security firm, Pinkerton Services Group, with its own Web site (Working Against
Violence Everywhere, W.A.V.E.) was set up so that students and parents could report
suspicious kids in schools who then would be investigated.
4. The work of Jaar (2000), an interventionist artist, offers a dramatic example. Jaar burned
down a cultural center (a museum) made of paper and wood that he was commissioned to
construct in the paper-mill town of Skoghall, Sweden. The pyrotechnic event was
predesigned to make the point that the city council would need to take their own initiative if
they indeed wanted a permanent culture center to exist. Here technology is turned on itself to
make an ethical statement.
5. Molyneux’s (2001) videogame called Black & White, which raises the question of good and
evil (albeit in a binary way), at least points to the problem I am signaling here.
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